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Except for a small number of recent studies2 existing literature on the contemporary
extreme right3 tends to follow a quite rigid country by country-based approach
which fails to develop common theoretical perspectives. The key weakness of these
specialised multi-country studies is neglect of a genuine comparative framework
which often results in collections of 'descriptive' essays. The primary intention of
this paper is to move beyond this approach and to offer a study of the extreme right
in contemporary France and Britain in comparative context. This study transcends
the limitations of country-specific accounts to answer the following research
question: why has the contemporary extreme right in France enjoyed much more
political success than the contemporary extreme right in Britain? A common
conjunctural model of extreme-right political success will be constructed at the
outset. This is intended to serve as a theoretical base for framing the comparison and
will act as the mechanism through which the primary research question will be
addressed.
A Conjunctural Model of Extreme Right Political Success
From comparative research on the experience of the Front National (National
Front, FN) in France and the National Front (NF) in Britain, it is possible to
construct a model which abstracts the combination of dynamics responsible for the
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development patterns of both political formations even though these development
patterns were strikingly dissimilar. Whereas the 1970s was a barren period for the
FN, the early 1970s saw growth for the NF. Popular support for the NF in the 1970s
peaked twice at relatively low levels, during 1972-3 and again during 1976-7, but
from 1977 the NF suffered sharp decline. Indeed, the experience of the NF from
1977 has been characterised by political failure, organisational schism, declining
electoral participation and eventual collapse.4 In marked contrast, the FN achieved
its national electoral breakthrough in 1984. and has subsequently consolidated its
national support base at between nine and fifteen per cent of the vote.5 Yet despite
this disparity, which makes comparison difficult, it remains that a common
conjunctural model can be extrapolated from these contrasting experiences. The
critical conjunctural conditions of this model can be outlined as follows.
The starting point is that right-extremist ideology (e.g. fascism) must exist at a
'transpersonal' level in the form of a 'carrier' organisation (e.g. the British National
Front). This 'transpersonal' level (i.e. transcending the individual) is where political
ideologies are said to exist as collective forces which interact with economic and
social conditions to shape historical events.6 In conceptual terms, ideological forces
can be seen to occupy a realm of 'political space' which is divided between a
dominant 'centre' (comprised of the legitimate political mainstream) and an
insignificant periphery (marginalised by the dominant political forces). In the post-
war period, right-wing extremism has occupied marginal political space in both
France and Britain, although an inchoate right-wing extremism briefly entered
mainstream, legitimate political space in France in the 1950s in the form of anti-
systemic Poujadism. However for the most part, right-wing extremism in post-war
France and Britain inhabited the political fringe and largely stagnated. In the late
1960s, the extreme right found itself correspondingly marginalised in both countries
and this means that the underlying location from which right-wing extremism in
the form of the NF and the FN emerged was essentially analogous.
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The second condition of this model is that, for early growth to occur, both the
'idea' (i.e. right-wing extremist ideology) and its collective representation must be
given credence - they must be allowed to enter the orbit of 'legitimate' or
mainstream political space. This is vital because mainstream political space consti-
tutes the centre of political interaction with society, and if right-wing extremism is
to grow as a political force, then it needs to be in a central position from where it
can inculcate society with its ideological concerns. In France and Britain, the FN
and the NF penetrated this central political space and in both cases, this came about
primarily through mainstream politicisation of the race issue. However, the
corollary to this is that if legitimate space is not opened up for the far right, it will
remain outside of the mainstream political locus and continue to be marginalised,
wanting political legitimacy.
Having gained entry, this space must be retained over the longer term. If it is not,
then the political representative (if not the idea or some variant of the idea) could
once again become marginalised. The retention of mainstream political space by
right-extremist parties seems to depend on two dynamics. Firstly, the persistence of
organisational legitimacy (the NF in the 1970s failed to construct or sustain lasting
political legitimacy) and, secondly, a failure by mainstream political organisations to
lessen available space for the extreme right. More typically, space for the extreme
right has been diminished through thematic appropriation of the race issue (e.g.
Conservative appropriation of the race issue in Britain in the late 1970s) but, that
said, the experience of the FN suggests that thematic appropriation by mainstream
political parties does not always result in the reduction of space. This may be
because such appropriation has either not appeared convincing or is simply
ineffective once an organisation has passed a certain support or credibility threshold.
iv
The final dimension to this model is the most important. Socio-economic
conditions (currently, the 'post-industrial' stage of economic gobalisation and rapid
technological change) determine the overarching historical context in which the
contemporary extreme right interacts with society and develops its appeal. A key
litmus test here is whether the historical context is one in which widespread personal
and political alienation is experienced, as this combination serves as a major factor
pushing individuals towards narrow ultranationalist responses.
In contemporary post-industrial societies, both personal and political alienation
seems to be derived from two sources. Firstly, personal alienation can result from a
crisis of community as structural change (rise of services, decline of labour-intensive
industries, competitive consumerism) continues to dissolve traditional sources of
social solidarity (class, work, religion, neighbourhood, family) and leads to increasing
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individualisation.7 Secondly, political 'dissensus',8 i.e. alienation from established
political elites, can arise from a crisis of confidence in the nation-state as national
politicians appear ineffective and incapable of ensuring full employment, main-
taining law and order, ensuring rapidly rising levels of affluence, and maintaining
adequate provision of services. This incapacity of mainstream politicians to solve
everyday problems can weaken the legitimising link between nation-state and
society, engender political disillusionment and insecurity and create a widespread
sense of crisis.
An important point is that this personal and political alienation shapes a climate of
anomie in which disorientated and disaffected individuals become susceptible to
ultranationalist and racist political mobilisation. This susceptibility must be under-
stood in terms of racism readily accommodating a basic need for orientation, identity
and rationalisation, especially at a time when individual difficulty or distress is
experienced. It is in an anomie environment, in particular, that ultranationalism can
assume a keen attraction as a possible source of meaning, belonging and identity
which relieves (if not cures) feelings of anxiety, estrangement and isolation. If the
aggregate level of personal and political alienation is extensive, then the underlying
growth potential for right-wing extremism appears great. If, however, the 'crisis',
i.e. difficulty or distress, is finite, then growth may reach an upper limit and not
proceed further.
Certainly as far as the recent experience of the contemporary extreme right in
France and Britain presents itself, the conjunctural occurrence of conditions (i) to
(iv) possesses significant explanatory power for understanding the electoral emer-
gence of extreme-right political organisations. It goes without saying that condition
(i) is vital. If there are no extreme-right traditions or extreme-right political parties,
then clearly extreme-right ultranationalism will not undergo mobilisation.
However, seeing as this current typically has some form of political expression, the
essential condition now becomes (iv), because if the contextual setting is hostile to
ultranationalist appeals then growth will become extremely difficult (if at all
possible). Conditions (ii) and (iii) are important in explaining actual levels of support
but (iv) remains the key determinant because it also defines the extent of potential
support and latent possibilities for growth. It thus provides the overarching context:
it not only accounts for why ultranationalism is able to develop its appeal in the first
place but also the potential threat that right-wing extremism can assume in the
contemporary setting.
Comparing the Front National and the National Front
The FN was conceived in the early 1970s by the neo-fascist parentage of Ordre
Nouveau ('New Order'), whose post-war lineage can be traced back to the small
7
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violent group Jeune Nation (Young Nation) which in the 1950s had exhibited a
profound hostility to democratic republicanism and was banned by the French
government in 1958.9 The FN was created by Ordre Nouveau along the lines of the
Movimento Sociale Italiano (Italian Social Movement) as a crypto-fascist party and
was intended to serve as the strategic vehicle for revolutionary nationalism.10 The
purpose of this two-dimensional strategy was to extricate the French far right from
the political backwaters by concealing the FN's true orientations behind a moderate
programme,11 while proselytising followers to revolutionary nationalism from
within. To expedite this strategy, Ordre Nouveau intended the subordination of
Jean-Marie Le Pen,12 which in due course led to intra-party confrontation,
organisational schism and eventual formation of a rival grouping, the Parti des
Forces Nouvelles (New Forces Party, PFN) in 1974. Yet rather confusingly, despite
this internal conflict, the FN's dual strategy essentially remained intact. A strong
neo-fascist contingent continued within the FN which could be readily perceived,
at least until the late 1970s, while the PFN sought acceptability through pragmatic
co-operation with the conservative right. But to no avail: during the 1970s both the
FN and the PFN largely met with public indifference in a period in which both
competed with each other in the stifling confines of political marginality.
9
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The failure of the extreme right in France in the 1970s can, in fact, be attributed
to a number of factors: the relative political (if not societal) quiescence of the
immigration issue which denied the extreme right a mobilising issue, allied with a
leftwards shift in French political culture and also to general organisational
difficulties (sectarianism, poor targeting of seats, financial constraints, etc.). Indeed,
it was only after the FN began to invest heavily in the issue of immigration from
1977/8, in the style of its British counterpart, that the situation began to improve.
Advantageously for the FN, this strategic shift corresponded with increasing main-
stream politicisation of the race issue. Perhaps the years 1977/8 could therefore be
seen as the very beginning of the FN's point of departure from the margins of
French politics, rather than, say, 1982, 1983 (or even 1984) as most standard
chronology seems to suggest.
The FN's decisive strategic shift towards focusing exclusively on the immigration
issue occurred for a number of reasons. Rising unemployment was a factor allied to
a desire to target a more populaire working-class constituency. Possibly the FN was
keen to follow in the steps of the NF,in Britain. Perhaps the key reason was Le
Pen's desire to fashion a unique identity'for the FN which he hoped would serve
not only to demarcate it from the rival "PFN (their identities by this time had
become somewhat conflated) but also to publicise the FN as being fundamentally
distinct from the political mainstream, as cjearly offering something new. But,
immigration was by no means a new concern on the French far right and, while it
did not continually fill early Frontist literature, it was nevertheless in evidence.
Indeed, the immigration issue had been a major preoccupation of Ordre Nouveau
and predecessors in the 1960s, such as the; Mouvement Nationaliste de Progres
(National Progressive Movement) and Europe-Action13 and also even the PFN
(though to a lesser extent). Yet the immigration issue had previously brought little
return for the French extreme right prior to the late 1970s owing to the de-
politicisation of race in France in the post-war period. This had essentially resulted
from the non-political nature of the decision-making process, where immigration
policy had typically been restricted to the realm of the technocrat, detached from
the political arena and therefore removed from mainstream political debate.14
Despite the FN's marginalisation in the 1970s, the fact that it continued to give
expression to the extreme-right tradition in France meant that in the 1980s it was in
a position to mobilise support specifically around the immigration issue. And, most
significantly, this perseverance paid dividends because, with the politicisation of race
at the end of the 1970s and early 1980s, legitimate political space for the FN opened
up. Interestingly, this race politicisation resulted from both national and local
dynamics, which then favourably interacted with an indigenous culture infused with
an intolerant colonial legacy. Nationally, for the most part it resulted from the
13
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increasingly interventionist state immigration policy of Giscard, culminating in the
Bonnet Law of 1980,15 national exposure of the apparently racist activities of the
Communist Party in late 1980 and early 1981,16 opposition reaction to the alleged
slackness of Socialist immigration policy between 1981 and 1984, national press
coverage of violent and criminal incidents involving second-generation immigrants
in the suburbs of Lyon, and the rising profile of unassimilable Islamic fundament-
alism.17 Locally, race poh'ticisation resulted from the spatial concentration of
immigrants, problems of cohabitation with the indigenous population and competi-
tion for welfare and social resources. This often generated a spontaneous backlash
and the subsequent appropriation of popular racism by local mainstream politicians
in areas of high immigrant density (e.g. Marseille in the early 1980s) which in turn
prepared fertile terrain for the FN at a local level.
Most importantly, this mainstream race poh'ticisation at both local and national
levels was articulated in terms of discriminatory language. An 'immigrant equals
problem' discourse acquired hegemony in the 1980s, often legitimised in the
pseudo-scientific language of the seuil de tolerance or 'threshold of tolerance'.18 This
negative discourse created room for the FN in the legitimate political orbit and lent
credence to Frontist discourse. Consequently, the arrival of the immigration issue at
the centre of the French political scene in the early 1980s was instrumental in the
electoral emergence of the FN as the political unfolding of the immigration issue
threw open the window of opportunity for Le Pen and carried the FN into
legitimate political space, thereby meeting the second conjunctural condition of the
model. The FN tended at first to follow on the back of this emerging political
agenda, rather than radically setting it. Agenda-setting was initially carried out
elsewhere but it was also incisive that in the run up to the European elections in
1984 the media clasped Le Pen and assigned him and his themes political
importance.19
It is also significant that the third condition of the model was satisfied: the FN's
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newfound political space was retained. Decisively, the FN established and sustained
itself as a legitimate political actor. This supplementary legitimisation issued from a
number of directions. Firstly, Le Pen was given credence by a benevolent national
and local media that did not actively seek to de-legitimise the FN (as the media did
to the NF in Britain). Instead it confirmed the political importance of Le Pen and
circulated his themes to the wider French public. Secondly, by 1984 the FN had
integrated itself into moderate-right political space (as a form of moderate extre-
mism) courtesy of a series of electoral pacts and thematic convergence with the
conservative right. The appropriation of 'twin' Frontist themes by the moderate
right (e.g. insecurity, which had become inextricably tied to immigration) further
bestowed legitimacy on Le Pen and did not cut away his sources of support,
presumably because either such appropriation did not appear persuasive enough to
cut any ice with the disaffected French electorate or because once the FN had made
its national breakthrough in June 1984. it had passed the required credibility
threshold. The failure of anti-Le Pen sections on the far right (e.g., the PFN and the
Parti Nationaliste Francais) to challenge Le Pen's hegemony further confirmed the
FN's credibility, especially with the effective collapse of the PFN by the mid-1980s.
Fourth, internal dynamics were also crucial: re-organisation carried out with much
professionalism, first under Jean-Pierre Stirbois and Michel Collinot,20 then under
the 'bourgeois' Bruno Megret,21 ensured that extremist edges, exemplified in the
likes of the neo-fascist Groupes Nationalistes-revolutionnaires (Nationalist-revolu-
tionary Groups)22 faction within the FN in the 1970s were smoothed down and
more intelligently hidden in the 1980s. The internal moderation of the FN after
1978 was a key manoeuvre in this respect because it allowed Le Pen to deflect
attempts at delegitimisation in a way that the NF in Britain seemed incapable of
effecting. Finally, while Le Pen's charisma has been rather overstated in the rise of
the FN,23 he nevertheless agglutinated the Front's rather volatile membership
coalition which had, by the mid-1980s, succeeded in incorporating more legitimate
renegade elements from the conservative right.
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That said, the Front national would never have taken off in such a dramatic
fashion without overarching structural conditions being favourable. To link once
again with the conjunctural model, it was of fundamental importance that the
fourth determinant interacted with, and occurred alongside, the other three
determinants. In the 1980s, the historical context was now more favourable to 'anti-
anomic' racist mobilisation, allowing the FN a key political opportunity to enlarge
its appeal. That is to say, firstly, considerable personal alienation appeared as the
transition to the post-industrial developmental stage in France triggered social
disintegration and a crisis of community in urban, de-industrialising, multi-cultural
regions (Paris and its surrounds, the Nord-Pas-de-Calais, Mediterranean littoral,
Alsace-Lorraine and Lyon). Deprived of compensatory sources of social integration,
this personal alienation turned to extremist nationalism by default.24 Heitmeyer has
applied a similar 'individualisation' thesis to western Germany to explain anti-
foreigner violence and perceptively acknowledges the workings of the same default
mechanism, where 'Nationalist feelings replace whatever seems to be missing from
the.individual's environment'.25
Secondly, this dissolution of community also occurred at a time of growing
political dissensus arising from an emerging crisis of the nation-state where the
French political class progressively lost its ability effectively to manage its own
national economic space as a consequence of economic transnationalisation and
globalisation.26 Established political elites could no longer deliver the goods in ways
in which French society had become accustomed and this had triggered a crisis of
confidence in the French political establishment by the early to mid-1980s.27 The
disillusionment which resulted from this apparent political impotence assisted the
FN by radicalising the electorate in the direction of anti-systemic appeals of the type
promulgated by Le Pen. Moreover, since the dominant ideologies in the post-
industrial era are those that endeavour to rationalise economic globalisation in terms
of international competitiveness, the mainstream nationalisms associated with left
(Mitterrand's nationalist programme of economic regeneration) and right (Gaullism)
which had generally served to contain the far right in the post-war period
disappeared from the foreground of French politics. As mainstream French politics
moved beyond nationalism in the 1980s to embrace the liberal-market economy,
the historic sense of national community and national identity came under pressure
and the legitimising link between nation-state and society was displaced. Conse-
2 4
 See Pascal Perrineau, 'Le Front national: 1972-1992', in Michel Winock, ed., Histoire de
I'extreme-droite en France (Paris: Seuil, 1993), 243—98; Emmanual Todd, The Making of Modem France.
Politics, Ideology and Culture (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), 192-203; and Pierre Brechon and Subrata Mitra,
'The National Front in France: The Emergence of an Extreme Right Protest Movement', Comparative
Politics, Vol. 25, no. 1 (1992), 63-82 . On application of the 'social isolation' hypothesis to electoral
support for the Front National between 1989 and 1994, see Nonna Mayer and Patrick Moreau,
'Electoral Support for the German Republikaner and the French National Front 1989-1994', paper
presented to the workshop on 'Racist Parties in Europe'.
2 5
 Wilhelm Heitmeyer, 'Hostility and Violence towards Foreigners in Germany', in Tore Bjorgo
and R o b Witte, eds. Racist Violence in Europe (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1993), 25.
2 6
 See Peter Hall, Governing the Economy (Oxford: Polity, 1986), 196.
2 7
 See Betz, Radical Right-wing Populism, 52-5.
no Contemporary European History
quently, and fortunately for Le Pen, with mainstream nationalisms withdrawing
from the centre of French politics by the early to mid-1980s, additional space was
opened up for narrow nationalist mobilisation at a time when, ironically, the
receding power of the nation-state was weakening the credibility of mainstream
nationalism.28
Significantly, the contemporary socio-economic context in France therefore
produced anomic individuals with distinct affinity for the ideas of the far right.
Clearly right-wing extremism in France has taken on increasing importance as
historical circumstances have created favourable conditions for individuals to want
to seek a racially defined, ultranationalist self-identification. This identification with
the idea of French ultranationalism has performed a key function in that it has
rationalised a period of transformation (i.e., the alleged decline of France) through
ostensibly scapegoating the immigrant (as well as more hidden Jewish conspiracy
theories for the more initiated). Without this overarching context, it is difficult to
see how the FN's ultranationalism could have had any chance of success. All things
considered, the fourth condition of the model was clearly satisfied in France: the
contextual setting became fertile for ultranationalist mobilisation in the early to mid-
1980s. Yet it is also an important consideration that this anomic context, of both
personal and political alienation, remains finite and, in the mid-1990s, still appears to
be largely contained in multi-racial urban areas undergoing de-industrialisation.
Corresponding to the origins of the FN, the British National Front was also
conceived from fascist parentage. The birth of the NF in 1967, under the initial
leadership of A. K. Chesterton, represented an amalgam of two non-Mosleyite29
strands on the British far right: A. K. Chesterton's apparently more moderate
League of Empire Loyalists30 merged with the obsessive anti-semitic Arnold Leese
stream occupied by Colin Jordan, John Tyndall and Martin Webster.31 Mirroring
early FN policy, although an anti-immigrant stance was present, this did not on
2 8
 On the crisis of national identity in France, see Brian Jenkins and Nigel Copsey, 'Nation,
Nationalism and National Identity in France', in Brian Jenkins and Spyros Sofos, eds, Nation and Identity
in Contemporary Europe (London: Routledge, 1996), esp. 108-21.
29
 Mosley created the Union Movement, which was 'Europeanist' in inspiration, following the
Second World War. See Anna Poole, 'Oswald Mosley and the Union Movement: Success or Failure?',
in Cronin, Failure of British Fascism, 53—80. The elements rejecting this approach in favour of extreme
British nationalism can be defined as 'non-Mosleyite'.
30
 A. K. Chesterton was a leading figure in the interwar British Union of Fascists. He broke with
Mosley in 1938 over Mosley's pro-German policy. In the 1950s he led the League of Empire Loyalists
which was more a pressure group than a political party. It engaged in a series of publicity stunts such as
infiltrating and disrupting Conservative Party conferences. On Chesterton, see Roger Eatwell, Fascism:
A History (London: Chatto and Windus, 1995), 264-5.
31
 In the 1930s, Arnold Leese was leader of the rabidly anti-semitic Imperial Fascist League which
had denounced Mosley as a 'kosher fascist' (!). In the early 1950s, the Imperial Fascist League was reborn
as the National Workers Movement. Following the death of Leese in 1956, Colin Jordan became heir
to the Leese tradition of virulent nazism. In the early 1960s, Jordan was joined by John Tyndall and
Martin Webster in the National Socialist Movement. Following the break-up of the National Socialist
Movement, and an interlude in the Greater Britain Movement, Tyndall and Webster joined the
National Front and proceeded to dominate the NF for much of die 1970s. On the formation of the NF,
see Richard Thurlow, Fascism in Britain (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987), 275—80.
The Extreme Right in Contemporary France and Britain 111
Chesterton's instructions assume priority in the first instance.32 However, the NF's
ultranationalism did take on an increasingly anti-immigrant character with the
advent of Powellism in 1968, even through a fear of non-white immigration had
fixed itself into far-right mentality following the Notting Hill riots of 1958 (e.g.
Mosley's Union Movement, Jordan's White Defence League). As in France, an
equivalent two-dimensional strategy lay behind the NF. While publicly distancing
itself from Nazism, and from other more radical groups such as the British
Movement, a fascist agenda was also cultivated inside the NF's organisational
confines, though in the British case it was less adroitly concealed by radical
populism. Nevertheless, in the same way as the FN ostensibly functioned in France
from the late 1970s, in Britain the NF looked to mobilise support around the
immigration issue.
The second conjunctural condition of the model, the opening up of legitimate
political space, occurred in Britain, as in France, with the mainstream politicisation
of race. However, unlike in France where race was not politicised until the late
1970s, in Britain it had already been politicised nationally in the 1950s with the anti-
black riots in Notting Hill and Nottingham in 1958.33 Yet in the 1960s, race was
subsequently de-politicised, removed from political debates by the establishment of
a bipartisan consensus between the Conservative and Labour parties. This consensus,
which accepted the need for controls on undesirable non-white immigration flows,
appeased racist opinion (also the result of an intolerant colonial legacy) but also
stimulated Powell's desperate challenge to this consensus in 1968 which carried
these racist perceptions to the logical extreme. As the window of opportunity
opened up for the FN in France through the politicisation of race, in the same way,
Powell's dramatic re-politicisation of the race issue in 1968 created legitimate
political space for the NF in Britain.34 Interestingly, as in France, the NF did not set
this agenda but rather followed in its tracks. Admitted by Powellism, the NF was
able temporarily to occupy this space once the Tories had appeared to have deserted
white interests with the Ugandan Asians crisis and Powell's subsequent defeat at the
Tory party conference in 1972, and this continued with Powell's later departure
from English politics in 1974.
However, a fundamental difference was that, unlike the FN, the NF failed to
retain this space. Once again referring to the theoretical model: although the NF
briefly entered the political mainstream on the back of Powell, it failed to
consolidate this position because ultimately it could not construct or sustain lasting
political legitimacy. Thus, the NF failed to satisfy condition (iii) of the conjunctural
model. It seems incontrovertible that the NF's inability to construct political
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legitimacy was a major reason for its electoral decline. Most critically, the NF's
room for manoeuvre in this space was reduced by both external and internal factors.
Externally, there was an unfavourable institutional (i.e. electoral) setting (there was
little room for legitimising electoral agreements with the conservative right as in
France). In its formative period, the NF did try to integrate itself into moderate-
right political space but efforts at infiltrating the Monday Club35 were firmly
rebuffed. Having failed to co-operate with the establishment Conservative right,
the NF then ran into extensive national and local media antipathy.36 Resolute
opposition by both the national and local media arrested further growth for the NF
and helped trigger its decline alongside other sources of opposition (anti-fascist street
demonstrations, trade union activities, Church leaders' pronouncements and so on),
all of which contributed to the NF's subsequent de-legitimisation. The NF was then
finally driven into marginality in 1978 by the persuasive Tory appropriation of race
which altogether diminished its space. Certainly it can be agreed with Messina that:
'Thatcher's reference to the "swamping" of British culture by immigrants on
television in 1978 was . . . a transparent effort to appropriate the National Front's
main electoral issue for the Conservative cause.'37 Given that Margaret Thatcher
had also made it plain that she hoped to entice Tory defectors to the NF back into
the Conservative camp, this manoeuvre does appear to be a model example of
premeditated appropriation of extreme-right themes carried out with the single aim
of dissolving the electoral appeal of the far right.
Moreover, internally the NF was far from dextrous in its application of two-
dimensional crypto-fascist strategy. Following the resignation of Chesterton in 1970,
the NF persevered with a transparent Nazi leadership in the form of Tyndall (now
leader of the British National Party) and Webster. Tyndall was Chairman of the NF
from 1972 to 1980, except for a short interlude as Deputy Chairman in the mid-
1970s, and Webster was the NF's National Activities Organiser. Unlike Le Pen,
both had clear Nazi pasts: both had been members of the National Socialist
Movement in the 1960s where they had been photographed in Nazi paraphernalia.
Tyndall and Webster were hardly an exemplary choice yet the NF retained this
hardline leadership, even though the NF was readily exposed as a 'front for Nazis'.
So, whereas the FN executed its two-dimensional strategy with dexterity after 1978,
the NF was far more careless and markedly failed to construct political legitimacy
from within. Moreover, it clung to provocative street marches as the dominant
mode of operation. These street operations quickly became associated with violence.
The predictable result was negative publicity which set the NF apart from the
parliamentary tradition. In addition, the party was prone to internal schism, merely
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serving to confirm a dearth of political credibility which was hardly assisted by the
ineffective and uncharismatic leadership of Tyndall. Beyond the NF's central
command, branch organisation was weak and the NF was plagued by branch
inactivity. There was rapid membership turnover (it had been suggested that 64,000
members passed through the NF between 1967 and 1979),38 and poorly selected
candidates were often put up with insufficient financial backing in areas that did not
have the greatest potential support. In due course, these multifarious internal and
external factors ensured that the NF's support declined from 1977.
Localised socio-economic conditions were favourable to a finite degree but,
because the third conjunctural condition began to malfunction during the 1970s,
support for the NF peaked twice at very low levels. Although this pattern seems to
confirm transient surges in popular support, re-application of the survey work of
Husbands attests to the existence of both personal and political alienation in pro-
Front cohorts in the 1970s. These cohorts were strongest in high ethnic minority
areas undergoing de-industrialisation.39 This anticipates the emerging pattern in
France, though in Britain anomie induced by de-industrialisation apparently
occurred at a lower aggregate level. The prime reason for this discrepancy appears to
be that, although the 1970s was a period of de-industrialisation, Britain had not yet
fully entered its post-industrialised phase of development. Moreover, although there
were problems with national economic management in the 1970s (rising unemploy-
ment, cutbacks in public expenditure, etc.) which encouraged political alienation,
the link between nation-state and society had not yet become displaced. Corporatist
structures remained until the arrival of Margaret Thatcher, and the economic
adjustment that followed with free-market policies, privatisation and deregulation
seemed to offer a popular alternative to old-style capitalism and apparent trade
union domination. The crisis of the nation-state in Britain in 1980s was therefore
concealed by a very populist, forcible, ideological approach to national government
which was periodically injected with doses of patriotism (e.g. the Falklands episode
in 1982). Consequently, while Margaret Thatcher's populism rejuvenated the link
between nation-state and society, in France the crisis of the nation-state more
clearly presented itself with the dramatic failure of Francois Mitterrand's Keynesian
experiment between 1981 and 1983.
Support for the NF in the 1970s may have matched levels of support that the FN
garnered had the other conjunctural conditions favourably interacted. Indeed, the
NF possibly had the implied support of close to fifteen per cent of the electorate.
NOP survey data from 1978 shows fifteen per cent of its sample British electorate
tending to agree with the statement that 'it would be good for Britain if some NF
candidates were elected to Parliament'.40 Had the NF achieved a modicum of
legitimacy it might have translated these sympathies into votes. The crucial point, of
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course, is this did not happen. The failure of the NF to retain legitimate political
space meant that support fell away at the end of the 1970s and the theoretical
schema was punctured.
Following electoral disaster at the 1979 General Election, the NF was down-
graded to its original starting position at the end of the 1960s: it was once again
marginalised and desperately wanted political legitimacy. Consequently, in a second
attempt to extricate itself from the political backwaters, a new strategy was
developed in the 1980s. Following its experience in the 1970s, the NF was
convinced that pursuing a Le Pen type two-dimensional strategy was futile given
the hostility of the British establishment.41 In Britain, the same strategy had failed in
the 1970s. As one NF activist (rather incoherently) explained, this was because:
the then NF leadership was ideologically ignorant and personally incompetent as having
manifested their ignorance and stupidity some years earlier in ways providing free gifts to
scaremongers. In France where M. Le Pen seems much more substantial and credible than
the self-proclaimed 'leaders' with which we were afflicted in the 1970s, this strategy may
work.42
A new strategy of radical nationalism that combined 'Distributism'43 with
'Community Action' subsequently appeared, the rationale behind it being that by
identifying the NF with native (i.e. non-fascist) nationalism and by involving itself
in public-spirited community action campaigns at the local level, it could counteract
allegations of Nazism. The aim was to bypass a hostile establishment and direct
ideological appeals straight to the British people. Community action would
demonstrably prove that the NF had a social conscience (which, of course, Nazism
lacked), while bringing ostensibly non-fascist 'Distributist' ideology direct to the
British people. However, the strategic plan was weakly carried out. It depended on
a high level of local activism which was not evident, and the ideology itself was
arguably far too esoteric and alien both to standard extreme-right traditions and
mainstream political culture in Britain to serve its declared function.
The credibility of the NF was further undermined from the mid- to late 1980s by
organisational schism as a new strategic division opened up within the party. This
division was outwardly one between mainstream radical nationalism and more
fanatical radical nationalism grouped around the so-called 'political soldiers'.44 The
political soldiers were intent on running down membership to allow for the training
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of a Herculean new man elite, to abandon electoral participation in order to focus
instead on the possibilities of armed insurrection combined with infiltration of
animal rights and ecological groups, while the other wing of the NF, known first as
the NF 'Support Group' and then the 'Flag Group', favoured a more traditional
electoral approach in similar manner to an old-style NF. The late 1980s saw the
adoption of increasingly esoteric ideology by the political soldiers, which included a
repudiation of biological racism, support for Islamic fundamentalism and for
Gaddafi's regime in Libya. It seems rather inconceivable that the political soldiers
actually believed that this radical ideology could achieve any degree of popularity
with the British people and, not surprisingly, the political soldiers collapsed by 1990.
Indeed, the experience of the NF in the 1980s suggests that strategies based on
radical, esoteric nationalism rather than anti-immigrant racial populism, do find it
painstakingly difficult to gain access to the precious orbit of legitimate political
space, especially when in Britain (as was the case with France) the potential support
base for the extreme right remains essentially grounded within a mainstream culture
already implanted with popular racism. More reasonably, the other wing of the NF
turned back towards adopting a Le Pen type radical populist strategy, but critically
the NF lacked a Le Pen type figure to give this two-dimensional strategy any
forceful direction. By the early 1990s, the NF was in a state of crisis: both
demoralised and highly marginalised. Finally, in July 1995, with a disappearing
membership now estimated to be between two and three hundred, the rapidly
disintegrating National Front decided to change its name to the National Democrats
in a desperate effort to engineer fresh stimulus. According to the NF, this decision
was reached because (understandably) the words National Front were 'tainted so
much by the mistakes of the past'.45
Conclusion
Why has the contemporary extreme right in France enjoyed much more political success
than the contemporary extreme right in Britain?
The response to this complex question lies in the dynamics of the common
conjunctural model. In both cases, the conjunctural occurrence of the four
conditions resulted in relative electoral growth, though at different times: the 1970s
for Britain, the 1980s for France. This conjunctural scheme operated in Britain in
the 1970s at a diminished level. It then declined and was de-activated at the end of
the 1970s, resulting in electoral decline for the NF. In France, the extreme right
hardly moved beyond the first stage in the 1970s, although in the 1980s the
conjunctural occurrence of conditions (i) to (iv) functioned at an elevated level,
resulting in the FN's national electoral emergence.
Initial impetus for the early growth of the NF in Britain came from Powell's
sensational challenge to the bipartisan consensus on race at the end of the 1960s,
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which opened up legitimate political space for the NF's racial populism. However,
this growth was then curbed by a marked failure to acquire supplementary
legitimisation owing to an unproductive relationship with the Conservative right,
internal deficiencies and a hostile national and local media backlash. Political space
for the NF was then further reduced by the Conservative appropriation of the race
issue towards the end of the 1970s. Noticeably, this space at a national level
continued to be occupied by the Conservatives' tough line on race throughout the
1980s and into the 1990s, exemplified by more restrictive controls on immigration
introduced in 1987, passage of the first Asylum Bill, exploitation of the race card at
the 1992 General Election and, more recendy, the passage of a further Asylum and
Immigration Bill in 1996.
Matching Britain, initial growth for the FN in France was made possible by the
increasing political importance of the race issue which carried the FN into legitimate
political space in the early 1980s. Significantly, this space was then cultivated (rather
than curbed) by a productive relationship with the conservative right, by internal
competence and, at least in the first instance, a benevolent national and local media
response. Once the FN had entered the legitimate orbit, structural conditions
resulting from the advent of the post-industrial stage of development created a
favourable socio-political configuration where both personal and political alienation
attracted anomic individuals towards transpersonal identification with the FN's
brand of extreme nationalism. In the 1990s, however, it appears that this con-
junctural schema may now have hit its upper limit in France. The extent of
structural strain which is spatially concentrated in urban, multi-racial areas is
geographically limited and this predominandy urban character militates against
further substantial growth for the FN.
It only remains to suggest that the common conjunctural model extrapolated
from this comparative study of the contemporary extreme right in France and
Britain seems to offer a premium analytical framework for evaluating relative
electoral success of extreme-right parties. Clearly it brings us closer to a broader
understanding of the causal processes behind the growth and decline of extreme-
right organisations and, as a result, could serve as an indicative theoretical basis for
further comparative research.
